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The Past as

What

Past Industrial
Conflicts within the
GOP Tell about the
Future of the Bush
Administration

Prologue?

Thomas Ferguson

This article analyzes patterns of GOP campaign finance with an eye to the light they can
shed on the future of the Bush administration. After flashing back to 1980 and 1984, it
presents a detailed statistical breakdown of who contributed to whom in the 1988 GOP

primary, based on a large and carefully constructed sample of top corporate executives

and investors. The Dole campaign emerges as

especially important for the clues

vides about the opponents of major changes in U. S. policy toward Eastern
the

it

pro-

Europe and

USSR.

the fall of 1989, as the trees pass from green to gold and long columns of birds twist
Insouthward
in the ever paler sunlight, the George Bush administration
still

than Ronald Reagan's at this stage
ords.

The press,

appears to be

—

The president's Gallup polls are high
far higher
of his first term. The stock market has broken all rec-

enjoying an exquisite Indian summer.

especially the networks, has been kind, amiably losing interest in Iran-

contra, the slow pace of appointments, and the spring flap with the Europeans over weap-

And a thick black cloud of scandal

ons modernization and arms control.
engulf congressional Democrats,

all

continues to

but obscuring Republican transgressions at

HUD

and elsewhere.
Beneath the calm, however, undercurrents of anxiety are everywhere detectable. The
possibility that even a

the

mild recession could turn into the long dreaded "hard landing" of

economy alarms many,

bonds

in their portfolios.

regardless of their political persuasion or the value of the junk

Almost every informed observer believes

that the eventual cost

of the savings and loan bailout will be far greater than the administration

while

all

scoff at the possibility that the budget targets mandated by

now

admits,

Gramm-Rudman for

1990 and 1991 can be met.

There

is

more. As jails

fill literally

to overflowing, the administration's

newly pro-

claimed war on drugs eerily recalls the early days of another war that the government tried

win on the cheap by emphasizing force and neglecting controlling, but more elusive,
Congress and the Defense
establishment try to pick and choose among weapons systems. And lost in the avalanche

to

social factors. Conflict over defense spending is intensifying as
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of publicity about Mikhail Gorbachev and Eastern Europe
also ebbing in Japan,

West Germany, and even

the plain fact that support

is

is

Great Britain for conservative regimes

in

long allied with the United States; that Latin America teeters on the edge of chaos; and

whole new "arc of crisis," which stretches from Pakistan through Burma and Korea
emerging
a circumstance that will not disappear even if the Cold

that a

—

to the Philippines, is

War does.
Not

surprisingly, last year's

Democratic campaign rhetoric,

like the

Daniel Quayle

many people around the globe
are likely to start wondering "Where's George?" and debating how best to read the mind
of the man who told everyone to read his lips.

jokes, no longer amuses. If not now, then sometime soon,

Save for the fortunate few sufficiently affluent to afford to purchase the expensive services of a

Washington "insider," most

istration's

will not find this

problem easy

exiguous track record thus far sheds comparatively

behavior in a crunch.

Nor

to solve.

light

on

The admin-

its

likely

are the abundant press accounts of puppies, golf, the presi-

dent's relations with Kennebunkport lobstermen, or

now recognize

little

how he

relates to the family

we

all

as "strong" likely to prove helpful.

How then can one forecast what the administration might do?

A perfectly sensible answer exists to this question,
plore. All through the 1980s, the Federal Election

on campaign contributions

which this article proposes to exCommission has been piling up data

major

to candidates of both

parties. This data

is

certainly in-

complete, but, in contrast to most speculations in the press and the social sciences,
provides real information that

is

it

quite independent of anyone's particular political views

or theories.
Accordingly, relying on methods developed in earlier essays, this article attempts to

—

combine data on the campaign contributions of top investors
the heads of the largest
companies and principal Wall Street firms, the Forbes 400 richest Americans, and so
forth

— with economic theory and what

is

known about the

the 1980 and 1984 elections to produce a kind of
pal corporate political constituencies.
its

interest

By

to

attending carefully to what each believes to be

and judging as best one can whether any

far better at forecasting the future of the

pattern of corporate support in

X ray of the new administration's princiis

apt to get

Bush administration

its

way, one

is

likely to

do

than, for example, by trying

now dwindled in many parts
when property suffrage restrictions were

read the mind of an electorate that in off-year elections has

of the United States to below the levels of 1798,

commonly

in force.

the heady days communicants
"Reagan Revolution's" heroic period, for the divisions that surfaced
within the business community during the 1988 election follow immediately from the
policy dilemmas created by the decisions taken then.
At that time, the height of what might be termed the laissez-faire revival, the incoming
Republican administration sought sweeping changes in both American society and the
world order. In the name of restoring domestic economic growth, it sought major cuts in
taxes on high incomes and corporations, rollbacks in environmental and safety regulaIt is

convenient to begin by casting a glance back to 1981

now

,

celebrate as the

tions

promulgated

in the 1970s,

major reductions

in federal

ownership and spending, and

a broad deregulation of the economy, including major changes in the administration of the

National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).
Its

ambitions, however, did not stop at the water's edge.

America, but the world, safe for free enterprise (which

it

It

planned not only to make

identified with

"economic

growth" tout court). To reverse what
the globe, the administration

particular focus

rearm and

on the navy.

it

claimed was a decline

commenced
It

in

American power around

the largest military buildup in history, with a

heated up the Cold War, pressuring Europe and Japan to

restrict exports to the Soviet bloc.

It

also sought to roll back the tide of state-

owned enterprise in the Third World and to pressure other countries to deregulate their
own markets, especially in finance. And it aggressively intervened in various Third World
trouble spots in favor of regimes

The almost millenarian frenzy with which
yphean labors

2

preferred.

it

the administration approached these Sis-

in its early days invited analysts, friends

and

critics alike, to

view

it

as a

political

formation sui generis. Critics, in particular, tended to treat Reaganism as the

political

program of a newly unified business community.

For a few months of 1980-1981

this line of

thought

is

not misleading.

A global analysis

of Reaganism in these terms, however, invites serious misunderstanding.
possible to understand the dynamics of the two Reagan terms

makes

It

it

im-

— with the abrupt switch

toward detente and interallied (G5 or G7, depending on the number of consulting countries)

economic cooperation during the second term

— or to analyze the forces now bear-

Bush administration.
The truth is that the Reagan coalition always had a huge seam running down

ing on the

That seam,

omy

that

in the last analysis, the ineluctable

we do,

divided the Reagan

camp

into

consequence of living

two

was crisscrossed by other seams too complicated

distinct blocs,

to discuss now.

in the

each of which,

The

middle.

its

world econin turn,

policies of the

Reagan administration served, or appeared to serve, the interests of major parts of both.
Each, however, had a somewhat different interpretation of what it thought was really
happening, and they basically disagreed about where the policies were supposed to lead.
In effect, the

Reagan Revolution was a giant banner under which two columns marched

in

different directions.

The

first

"bloc" (one almost hesitates

to

employ the expression, since

this

group, in

sharp contrast to the second, exists largely in a reactive mode, defined preeminently by

what
ety,

opposes, and since the 1930s,

it

when

it

lost its

dominant position

in

American

soci-

has never succeeded in articulating a well-developed alterative point of view) might be

referred to as the "protectionist" bloc.

As

the label suggests, this bloc, centered in old industries long tied to the

textiles

GOP,

like

or steel, saw the Reagan Revolution largely as political and economic Alka-Selt-

—

from imports, from labor, from hated government regulators, and, perhaps,
from endlessly menacing Communists
was only a jubilant swallow away.

zer: relief

—

In sharp contrast the second bloc, or
set the

more precisely, its leading spokespersons, who
more expansively (and they were indeed

tone for the rest, were thinking far

thinking, in the sense that

all

through

this

period they were making major investments in

policy-oriented research published through a wide variety of think tanks and research
institutions).

To sum up the views of this second "multinational" bloc in a few pithy sentences ineviand risks exaggerating the degree of centralization and consensus

tably invites caricature

within

it.

Nevertheless, with due allowance for these pitfalls,

its

thinking can be not inac-

curately analyzed as the polar opposite of the fashionable "imperial overextension" cri-

Reaganism brought to public attention most
Kennedy in his Rise and Fall of the Great Powers.
tique of

forcibly by Yale historian Paul

3

It is

— organized in such groups as the Committee for the
— who in 1980 were calling for a six-hundred-ship navy, worldwide "hori-

not that the business leaders

Present Danger
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zontal escalation" in the event of war with the Soviet Union, major
ization

programs, and an end

to the

"Vietnam syndrome"

analogies with the Dutch, French, or British empires.
qualifications, continue to see

— the comparison differently.

In their view, the overriding issue in the world

areas

It is

new weapons modern-

— necessarily shrank from
that they saw — and, with some

was whether the three great economic

— the Pacific Rim, the Americas, and Western Europe — were going to develop

"cooperatively" into one essentially "worldwide" multinational market, or whether these
areas would go their

way

this issue

own

The

way, probably under the influence of a regional hegemony.

was resolved would shape development

in the

Third World and, in the long

run, perhaps even the Second.

From this

standpoint the vast

American expenditures on

that critics of imperial overextension fear will

sented major investments

military force and foreign aid

bankrupt the United States actually repre-

— in free trade and an integrated world economy committed to a

dollar standard.

Not only would these investments help

stabilize the

Third World, and thus lower the

target rate of return a multinational required before deciding to invest, but the military

buildup, in addition, was a vital U.S. bargaining chip with the other major Allied govern-

ments. Only the United States could afford the fabulous costs of the guarantees, both
conventional and nuclear, that, in a deep sense, provided the social overhead capital for
the postwar recoveries of Japan

project

enough force

As long

into the

and Western Europe. And only the United States could

Middle East

to protect the oil supplies of the Allies.

as the United States maintained

governments had

little

its

military dominance, therefore,

incentive to try to go their

own

way, and

European

many reasons

to cooper-

So did the Japanese, a fact that by 1980 had become of towering significance to many
American businesses, which were increasingly convinced that exclusion from the Pacific
ate.

implied banishment from the next century's fastest-growing region.
In the late seventies, after the West
States

German

refusal to reflate in

tandem with the United
which

and Japan wrecked the Bonn summit, most members of the second bloc

included multinational manufacturers and financiers, but
firms, oil companies, and

weapons producers

as well

many

—

exporters, high-tech

— became convinced that only

dramatic (albeit temporary, for the eventual policy aim remained cooperation) unilateral
action by the United States could break the

economic deadlock

that

was developing

"Triad" (today's buzzword) or "Trilateral" (yesterday's) world and avert the

drift

in the

toward

state-owned enterprises in the Third World. With increasing talk of repricing internationally traded

raw materials (read

oil) in

another currency as U.S. rates of inflation raced

ahead and the dollar depreciated, these businessmen

became convinced

that only truly

— and increasingly -women — also

Draconian monetary policies could end inflation and

save the dollar.

The atmosphere of intensifying

crisis

enormously advantaged the only

political party

were thinkable: the GOP Multinationals that
had been perfectly prepared to support Democrats during the New Deal era abruptly cut
off their support or intensified their commitments to Republicans. So, at the same time,
for

which massive

social expenditure cuts

did the traditional protectionist bloc.
all

sorts of

"new

right," "old right,"

Not

surprisingly, the first result

was confusion, as

and "neoconservative" cultural and

political entre-

preneurs competed to tap the rivers of cash that rapidly began flowing.

Under the inflexible pressure of political deadlines, however, a more or less articulate
compromise emerged within the Republican party. Candidate Reagan struck a formal
agreement with Senator Strom Thurmond on behalf of the textile industry and appears to

have

made promises

to several other industries, including steel, while publicly

the merits of free trade.

The prospective general

revision of General

trumpeting

Agreement on

Tar-

and Trades (GATT) ardently desired by the free traders was put off until after the

iffs

administration had had

some time

to force restructuring

powerful industries were promised piecemeal protection

By temporarily removing

the divisive trade issue

on the
in the

rest of the world, while

meantime. 4

from the agenda,

this deal

— which,

it

should probably be noted, was struck by Ronald Reagan rather than George Bush, the
choice of many multinationalists

first

the

Golden Horde

that financed the

in the

Eastern Establishment

GOP's sweeping triumph

— opened the way for

in the fall

of 1980.

Once

the

decision to raise interest rates was taken by Paul Volcker during the Carter administration,

what multinational would object

for example,

contemplated the promised import

relief,

to

domestic restructuring?

And as

what protectionist would object

to a

they

new

Cold War?

From this
first to

vantage point

forswear

early 1985, as

As

came

G5

it is

easy to see the logic that drove the Reagan administration

cooperation and noisily to denounce the "evil empire," and then, in

James Baker took over

at Treasury, dramatically to reverse

both policies.

power the administration faced a set of decisions that could easily split its
coalition apart. Not surprisingly, it moved very cautiously. To the disgust of Secretary of
State Alexander Haig, it declined to make a major issue of Central America at that time.
To the dismay of social conservatives, it famously placed social issues on the back burner.
The Reagan administration concentrated instead on economic issues that sent broad
it

to

rivers of cash flowing to all

its

supporters in the business community: the military

NLRB, and the centerpiece of its economic program, the famous tax cuts. After some fits and starts (the administration's
earliest economic projections rejected the advice that Herbert Stein, Walter Wriston, and
other analysts were giving it not to make the usual ritual promise to avoid fighting inflabuildup, deregulation, personnel changes at the

tion

by means of unemployment, and envisioned only a short recession), the Reagan ad-

ministration

fell in line

with Volcker's high-interest-rate policies.

The result, from the administration's standpoint, was a series of striking successes.
Along with its new labor policies and deregulation, the high interest rates triggered a
sweeping reorganization of the work force. Unions lost ground and wage growth slowed
as many firms took advantage of the huge rise in unemployment to make major cuts in
staffing and changes in work rules. As other central banks transmitted the interest rate
rises to their countries
and, pushed by the Reagan administration, promoted deregulation of their own economies
a worldwide movement toward laissez faire gained steam.

—

—

The growing climate of austerity,

in turn,

encouraged further cuts

taxes everywhere, while the rise in the dollar reestablished

currency and started an export

boom

in

Europe and Japan

its

in social

spending and

position as the world's

that helped

undo the damage

caused by the evil-empire rhetoric.

The policies, however, could not be sustained
was the deepest recession of the postwar
lutely,

forever.

era. In the

The

price of the interest-rate rise

Third World growth ceased abso-

while in the United States imports flooded in and business bankruptcies mounted,

bringing friction with Japan and calls for import

relief.

Although they went along with the

intermediate nuclear forces (INF) deployment, Europeans resented the administration's

And, as it seems clearly to have foreseen,
enough spending cuts to offset the tax reductions, leading

efforts to discourage business with the Soviets.

the administration failed to get
to

an enormous

rise in the

Political opposition

budget

deficit.

emerged on both

the left and the right.

On the

"left" (the term

is

New England Journal of Public Policy

highly relative: the reference

Democrats revived.

lines of that presented for
ily)

the Northeast and

and mass

is

1988 below, shows clearly how real estate interests

Midwest moved

to

in (primar-

defend federal grants for urban infrastructure

from the burgeoning claims of the defense budget.

transit

community), the

to the differences within the business

A breakdown of 1984 Democratic campaign financing, done along

(Statistical tests

showed the real estate bloc, but not the other industries that also featured high levels of
Democratic contributions, supported only liberals, precisely what one would expect if
competing claims on the budget were the

issue.)

5

As

the deficit mounted,

ment bankers — and some insurance industry figures — joined them.

On the right Jack Kemp emerged as a champion of a
essentially

Reaganomics with low

interest rates

interest rates.

invest-

"supply side" economics that was

For business

were pushed low enough, the United

many

6

its

key claim was that

grow

States could

its

if

way out of the

any new taxes.

deficits without

How the administration rode out this heavy weather bears close analysis for the light
can shed on what a Bush administration might do. To defuse protectionist sentiments

it

it

deployed a three-pronged strategy: to the biggest and most powerful industries, notably

and automobiles,

steel

it

afforded continued piecemeal protection. To agriculture and

some exporters it offered limited export subsidies, either in the form of direct loans or, in
the case of some high-tech industries, funds for basic research. Finally, it pressed other
countries, particularly in East Asia, to open their markets to American products.
Faced with the need
ministration also

were so

two blocs pulling

in different directions, the ad-

a set of fundamental choices on the deficit. Because the tax cuts

attractive to both blocs, but particularly to the protectionists,

fated to be

a stand.

to hold together

made

submerged

Still

in the

who

were, after

long run, they provided the perfect issue over which to

all,

make

hoping that ballooning deficits would eventually force spending cuts, the

administration proceeded, loudly and publicly, to draw a line in the sand.

To finance the
First

it

deficits in the

meantime, the administration devised a two-track

strategy.

accepted "revenue enhancements" that did not threaten the sacrosanct position of

the top brackets, including a steep rise in highly regressive Social Security taxes,

over time would close most of the deficit. Then, in a truly

momentous

decision,

it

which
elected

to let foreign capital finance the deficit.

From the standpoint of the multinational bloc as a whole, this move had a compelling
By worldwide standards, direct investment in the American economy was quite low.

logic.

Direct investment, in sharp contrast to portfolio investment,

is

reasonably stable. Here,

moved to prohibit foreign
As it did, it would support

accordingly, was a chance to square the circle. Provided no one
takeovers, capital could flow into the United States for years.

the dollar while helping mightily to finance both the trade and the government deficits. At
the

same time

it

would create a more powerful lobby

in the

United States in favor of free

trade and an integrated world economy, while also giving major foreign interests compelling reasons to let U.S. multinationals continue operating in their

As

home

territory.

wake of the Mexican debt rescue and defense spending began
to pull the economy out of its slump in classic Keynesian fashion, the administration had
the satisfaction of watching its new policies pay off. The economic revival and foreign
buying led to a tremendous boom in the stock market. The new wave of mergers and takeovers, in turn, further restructured industry while creating a substantial number of new
interest rates fell in the

fortunes in finance and commodities markets with a stake in Reaganomics.

— an ingredient of the largest political business cycle since the Great Depres— carried the administration safely through the 1984 elections. The continued

The boom
sion

10

strength of the dollar, however, fueled protectionist sentiment, further inflaming relations

with Japan and the Asian newly industrialized countries.

something had

that

to

By

early 1985

it

was obvious

be done or the whole postwar structure of multinational trade might

moved to retaliate.
The administration moved on several fronts at once.

unravel as the U.S. Congress

egy

had employed for defusing relations with Japan

it

First

it

added wrinkles

1983-1984.

in

It

to the strat-

pressed the Japa-

nese to open markets for a handful of the most impatient sectors, whose support

it

was

counting on to head off a protectionist upsurge, including telecommunications, electronics, forest

products, medical instruments, and pharmaceuticals.

Next, as an alternative to "industrial policy," the administration joined

many Republi-

up "competitiveness," that is, the notion that improved
macropolicy and some broad structural changes (such as improvements in education) that
can big-business leaders

involved

little

in talking

market intervention might

direct

alleviate the overseas challenge.

Then, largely through the Pentagon (but mostly outside "Star Wars"), where by a mirais not reckoned as a violation
announced a spectacular program of subsidies, again

cle of nomenclature "defense"-related production direction

of the principles of free enterprise,

it

mostly to "swing" industries dominated by multinationals
tion.

for the presidency,

gram

in,

or potentially

in,

the coali-

Among these projects, which continued to be announced as Bush geared up to
in

were a $4

run

billion supercollider project, a five-year, $1.7 billion pro-

computing, a dramatic new "superconductor"

lously expensive space station (the

fabu-

initiative, contracts for a

announcement called

attention to the benefits the

project would produce for the pharmaceutical and electronic industries), "Sematech," a
joint venture

between the government and high-tech companies, as well as other

initiatives

computer-aided manufacturing, and materials science.

in robotics,

While the administration was taking these

little-publicized

moves

that

might

in

time

transform the Pentagon into an American Ministry of International Trade and Industry,

moved

at last to

With Baker

which leads

it

bring the dollar down.

at the

Treasury, a

new and more delicate phase of relations with the Allies,
dilemmas George Bush faces, began. In effect the ad-

directly to the policy

ministration was seeking what might be termed a "gentler, kinder" dollar decline. For
this to

happen, the cooperation of the Allies, particularly Japan and West Germany, was

essential. Specifically, if the dollar

were

U.S. current account, the Japanese and

to decline, thus reducing the

Germans would

imbalance

not only have to agree to

in the
let their

export surpluses shrink, they would also have to expand their domestic economies to avoid
a decline in total world demand. They would, in addition, have to cooperate in guarding
the relative exchange rates of the major currencies, or there

would be massive

flight

from

the dollar.

Neither country was eager to do any of this. Both had grown rich in the postwar period

by pursuing strategies of export-led growth, and both feared

demand might well

that

an expansion of internal

disequilibrate carefully struck balances of power between labor and

management.
Baker, however, had several strong incentives of his own. First, in the background there

remained always the United
in defense.

By pushing

"security" required

States'

the Allies to

trump card,
do more

its

overwhelming comparative advantage

— or sometimes by upping the ante of what

— the United States could exercise real leverage by threatening to

on them.
Second, there was Baker's well-advertised policy of negotiating

raise costs

bilateral trade treaties

with particular countries, the most significant of these being the recent agreement with

11
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Canada. By suggesting that the United States might go

it

alone with a handful of carefully

selected partners, these deals acted as a check on Allied intransigence.
In the end, however, Baker's

most potent

threat proved to

States could just threaten to let the exchange rate

be the simplest: the United

drop unilaterally

if

the Allies would not

agree to an orderly decline. Though in October 1987 this strategy of brinkmanship took
the world to the edge of the abyss,

monished the Germans
ket, in the

end

when Baker and

provoking an upcoming

worked. After

other Treasury officials publicly adthe dollar and crash in the mar-

fall in

bitter internal debates,

Japan expanded internal demand

and dismantled a few trade barriers. Germany also made rather feebler

substantially
forts to

it

for

expand. The dollar continued coming

central banks built
critics noted) a

down until

up massive dollar reserves,

the

summer of

in effect subsidizing (as several acute

vigorous political business cycle for Bush to run on. 7

Animated not only by

its

growing concern

for Allied

ing pressures of the budget deficit and plain fact that

if

harmony, but also by the unyieldthe United States

the USSR, the West Germans would, the administration abandoned

posture.

ef-

1988, as foreign

Led by new Commerce Secretary William

Verity, food

its

would not

sell to

strident anti-Soviet

companies, capital goods

exporters, and several business organizations, the administration began to explore ave-

nues for increasing trade.

It

also, of course, negotiated the

INF accord and

a Soviet with-

drawal from Afghanistan.
In electoral terms there can scarcely be any question that the policy package

Baker were gradually fashioning for the vice president
ity

— was highly plausible, particularly

about the long run.

As an

if

loyalty of

But multinationals
active in the

run on

Bush and

— peace and prosper-

one refrained from asking awkward questions

early Fortune poll of top executives indicated, and the astonish-

ingly high level of contributions revealed in

commanded the

to

my

statistical

study confirms, their agenda

most main-line multinationals. 8

— and Allied financiers — are far from the only business groups

GOP. Moreover, major veins of dissatisfaction

existed within the multina-

tional bloc itself, particularly in regard to detente.

As

campaign approached, ominous signs of dissatisfaction began to appear on
GOP. Congressman Jack Kemp, who during most of President Reagan's
office had usually been counted Bush's strongest prospective opponent for the

the 1988

the right of the

tenure in

nomination, stridently denounced the

INF

treaty

and began running furiously against

detente and the "sellout" of freedom fighters around the globe.

Donald Rumsfeld, once Gerald Ford's hawkish secretary of Defense and then CEO of
Searle, a large pharmaceutical concern, began scouting a run, also looking right-

G.D

ward. So did another card-carrying multinational Cold Warrior, Alexander Haig.
Pierre du Pont, a onetime moderate Republican governor of Delaware, announced on a

warmed the heart of the elder Pierre du Pont, who as head of the
company during the New Deal was one of FDR's sharpest critics. TelRobertson also declared on a platform that on defense and many other top-

platform that would have
family's chemical
evangelist Pat
ics

was well

to the right of Attila the

Hun. And

to the surprise of practically

everyone

who

does not closely follow the political economy of the GOP, Senator Robert Dole finally

came down
Not

all

well to the

Bush campaign's

right.

these candidates were equally formidable.

Kemp,

for example,

identified as the partisan of supply-side economics. In years past he

portant supporters from aerospace and defense
tions first of all as an entry in the profits

by Kemp's insistence

that detente

was strongly

had also drawn im-

—

enterprises for which the deficit funccolumn and which would certainly not be put off

was a dangerous

12

illusion.

But as earlier observed, the

meaning of supply-side doctrines for the average business was lower interest
early 1988, however, Baker had been bringing the dollar down for almost three
years. With exports booming and the economy beginning to bump up against what most
business economists reckoned was full capacity (whatever the numbers of discouraged
practical
rates.

By

workers

who no

longer figured in the unemployment

new monetary experiment? And

was obviously a plausible standard-bearer

what was the point of a

statistics),

despite the intraparty

row over

detente, the vice president

for defense in the fall

campaign against the

Democrats.

Not

surprisingly,

attracted to

Kemp's

few of the Republican business leaders who had
"exciting

new ideas" were

still

in years past

excited by them.

been

When Kemp un-

furled the banner of aggressive free enterprise, only a comparative handful of deregulation enthusiasts, such as

(Table

Dow

Chemical's Paul Oreffice, along with a

committees or executives from savings banks,

political action

a few defense contractors (such as Martin Marietta's

1),

to the end,

number of

and transportation

Thomas Pownall)

and anointed keepers of the supply-side flame (including,

Lehrman and

fair

utilities,

for

a tiny knot of developers probably attracted by the future

Housing and Ur-

ban Development secretary's emphasis on "enterprise zones") saluted. The
times after pausing respectfully,

faithful

example, Lewis

rest,

some-

moved on. 9

Table 1

Industries in
(The universe of comparison

Which
is all

Particular Republicans Did Well

Republican contributors.)

Bush (N = 436; 69%)

Dole (N = 324; 51 %)
Services (0.10)

Oil (0.11)

Computers

Real estate (0.06)
Insurance (0.01)

(0.06)*

Investment banking

(0.13)

Investment banking

Utilities (0.13)*

Autos

Dupont(N =

112;

(0.02)

(0.15)

MNCO-MIC (0.01)

18%)

Chemicals (0.01)
Commercial banking (0.01)
Investment banking (0.01)

Private hospitals (0.15)

Kemp(N =

60;

10%

Utilities (0.16)*

Haig(N

=

2%)

Savings banks (0.16)*

Aircraft (0.01)*

Transportation (0.12)*

MNCO-MIC (0.07)*

Beverages (0.01)*

Real estate (0.15)*

Real estate (0.05)*

13;

Numbers in parentheses are significance levels, not strength; they indicate only positive differences
from each candidate's average industry appeal.
^Expected value

in cell

of chi-square less than

Source: Based on FEC data; see

Du Pont,

5;

warns that power of test

is

low.

text.

in all probability, really

had

his eye

on

either the vice presidency or

on 1992 or

1996. Save for the press, which kept hailing his iconoclasm and "courage" in tackling the

sacred cows of farm subsidies and Social Security, the family circle, which includes a
dazzling

number of the Forbes 400

trated in

one industry, skew Table

number of top

wealthiest

1 's

Americans who, because they are concenand a surprising

portrait of the chemical industry,

bank executives who, as the people most concerned with the
were perhaps making small votive offerings in honor of
attract much support from business, or anyone else.

financiers and

future of the dollar in the 1990s,
the "courage," he failed to
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Neither did Haig, whose appeal as a right-wing internationalist overlapped that of the
later

Dole or du Pont, but who also had

down

to live

a reputation as an unguided missile.

(Perhaps appropriately, the aircraft industry and a specially defined bloc of superhawks
discussed below in reference to the Dole campaign backed
licans at a statistically significant level.)

run for president,

And

thriftily called

10

him compared to other Repub-

Rumsfeld, after contemplating what

Pat Robertson's campaign, for

which badly hurt some of his major financial backers,
had over the years probably invested more

in the sector that

any other. The coup de grace to

came with

party presence,

costs to

which the media and many scholars had been pre-

dicting a heavenly future, staggered under two deadly blows. First
prices,

it

off his effort, as did Nevada Senator Paul Laxalt.

it

like

came

the collapse of oil

Nelson Bunker Hunt,

in fundamentalist politics than

as a serious national threat, as distinct

from annoying

the disastrous news, retailed for days with ill-concealed glee by

three big multinationals called

ABC, NBC, and CBS,

Charlotte, North Carolina, by Jim and

Tammy

of apparent devilish doings in

Faye Bakker, and an unorthodox form of

witness practiced in Louisiana motels by the Reverend

Jimmy Swaggert.

Dole as the person with the best chance of stopping Bush. As all the world
knows, he came within a hair of doing precisely that. Because of the light it sheds on the
That

left

potential opposition the

how he
It is

did

Bush presidency now

faces,

it is

exceedingly instructive to see

it.

possible that a few people

who

eventually hopped on the

bandwagon did so simply
who was then

because they believed that Dole might run a stronger race than Bush,

viewed by many

in his party the

way many Democrats now regard Michael Dukakis. Such

cases, however, should be scattered randomly, not concentrated in particular sectors

and certainly not

in sectors in

one or another particular
easy to show

which prominent

issue.

statistically that

Dole very clearly succeeded

Though my

data

is

—

openly campaigning for

industrialists are

not perfectly adapted for this task,

it

is

while Dole and Bush did have partially overlapping appeals,
in tapping sectors

(and parts of sectors) with a plausible

grievance against Bush."

Dole's

initial

campaign impressions,

had compiled as Senate Republican

much harder than Bush.

from the record he

for example, derived mostly

leader. In that role

Indeed, as Table

1

shows,

among Republican

appeal to investment bankers and insurance executives

of long-term bonds, as Democratic candidates

he had pressed hard on the

know

deficit,

contributors Dole's

— sellers and buyers, respectively,
— stands out compared with

so well

Bush's. (For both candidates, statistical tests of significance suggest each had above-

average support from investment bankers, but the results for Dole are impressive, while
the results for

Bush are borderline.)

As he kicked

off his campaign, he was also

known

credentials on that score, while scarcely negligible,

as a friend of Israel, whereas Bush's

were suspect

in

some

quarters. His

campaign contribution list also suggests a certain closeness with the commodities markets
(though here Bush and Baker were not idle: it is surely no accident that Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady has yet to move on his own report on the Crash, which recommended
reining in Chicago) and Dole was in any event a hero to large export-oriented farmers.

The veteran member of the Senate Finance Committee
port from some private hospital chains and parts of the

also

seems

All this, however, provided a rather narrow base.
into a call for

have attracted sup-

Dole tried developing the
"burden sharing" by the European Allies (by which he appears

envisioned fewer cuts in U.S. defense expenditures rather than a
in the future).

to

service industry.
deficit issue
to

have

more rapid European

This would have freed up resources for some domestic spending, which

14

rise

Dole several times pointedly observed had been neglected under Reagan, and Table
suggests that

some

real estate

magnates either got (or more

likely, sent) the

1

message. But

community hung back. For all the talk about how the compassionmake a stronger candidate against the Democrats,
the plain fact was that Bush's campaign was rolling ahead.
After hesitating almost interminably, Dole made a fateful choice. In a complex maneuver, in which he came out for the INF treaty but positioned himself as a stern critic of the
other treaties the administration was talking up, he joined with the right and center-right
opponents of detente. He also spoke out strongly on the importance of the American posithe rest of the business

ate, yet fiscally

responsible Dole would

tion in the Persian Gulf.

The
sis,

result

was a

political coalition that leaves little trace in

but which shows up spectacularly

parison: the largest

(all

those

among

when one

regular industry analy-

on the 1987 Fortune list)
Chevron (which both have major deals
subset of firms in the aircraft industry whose princithe top

20

my

defines a very special universe of com-

industrials

multinational oil companies except Occidental and
in

USSR)

progress with the

pal business

is

plus the

producing major warplanes and missiles. This "industry" (or

better,

world

—

shown in the table as the MNCO-MIC
Multinational Oil-Military 12
Industrial Complex
bloc, swung massively for Dole.
As Dole rushed in on Bush, top executives or political action committees of companies
such as Lockheed, General Dynamics, Northrup, and Rockwell all contributed. Henry
historical force),

—

Kissinger, the living incarnation of prudent multinational skepticism about detente, began
to confer

with him. 13

A remarkable number of executives from big multinational oil con-

It is doubtful that oil-policy differences between the candiBush and Dole did not differ greatly in regard to that policy,
though as the race heated up Dole made some halfhearted and not particularly convincing
noises about an oil tariff, which many independents, but not most majors, supported.
Along with gold, however, oil and natural gas are the principal balancing items in EastWest trade. Many Europeans, indeed, take it for granted that the primary limit on how

cerns also began donating.
dates accounted for this.

much they can
them. With

sell

the Soviets in the short run

oil prices

already down,

it is

is

how much

gas

Moscow

can

sell

back to

unlikely that most major oil companies not in-

volved in deals with the Soviets relish the prospect of large-scale sales into the West any

more than they

did in the 1920s or 1950s,

when

this issue

spurred major agitation in

the industry.

Preston Tisch, the brother and close business associate of Lawrence Tisch,
recently acquired

Dole.

14

CBS, resigned

as postmaster general, returned to

who had

CBS, and declared

for

Then, as the center-right criticism of Bush reached a crescendo just ahead of the

Iowa primary, Dan Rather,

who had previously

created a

ghanistan, conducted a highly publicized interview with

stir

by briefly slipping into Af-

George Bush about

his role in the

Iran-contra affair.

Though
Bush

analysts debated

in Iowa, or, as

who won that exchange, no one disputed that Dole defeated

Haig, Rumsfeld, and other multinational Cold Warriors came out for

him, that he seemed on the verge of knocking the vice president out of the race. In

Hampshire, however, the Bush forces were led by Governor John Sununu who,

New

Bush
was an ardent proponent of nuclear power (witness Table 1 's suggestion about the
15
utilities) and the licensing of the controversial Seabrook, New Hampshire, nuclear plant.
Sununu, whose political rise began with the encouragement of a lobbyist for Westinghouse, 16 had taken great care to organize the state. Aided by enormous infusions of cash,
Bush's campaign eked out victory there.
himself,

15

like
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As

the

campaign headed south, Dole

tried a classic

maneuver. At

least three times in the

past twenty years, a right-wing candidate confronting a strong free trader has cemented
the alliance of the center with the right by explicit
tectionist industrial sectors.

Dole came out

from Bethlehem and USX, the automobile

commitments

to textiles

in public for protection.

some

industry,

figures

As

and other pro-

top executives

from the electronics

industry almost certainly worried about the Japanese, and prominent textile leaders, in-

cluding Roger Milliken (a prominent advocate of "buy American" policies) contributed

—

like Richard Nixon and Ronald
campaign, Dole struck a formal arrangement
Reagan before him
with South Carolina Senator Strom Thurmond, a longtime cham-

to his

—

pion of the

17

textile industry.

Now, however,

the devastating long-term effects of the high dollar (and the benefits to

the free traders of the administration's decision to postpone major legislation at the time

Reagan's coalition came together) showed. After seven years of imports, and gradual
transformation of the southern industrial structure from a heavy reliance on textiles to
finance, services, and electronics, along with a few examples of successful textile restruc-

was hollowed

turing, the old southern protectionist industrial base

mond couldn't deliver. The Bush

out. This time

Thur-

machine's multinational juggernaut rolled over Dole,

effectively destroying his candidacy.

It

also flattened Pat Robertson, who, too, had

made

a

whose candidacy had been badly, perhaps fatally, hurt by
which had greatly limited efforts on his behalf by Bunker Hunt and

strong protectionist appeal and
the oil price collapse,

other southwestern supporters.

Being Right and President

An

analysis of the sort presented here

ball

and cannot hope

course.

to

it

a less than perfect substitute for a reliable crystal

Whether Vice President Daniel Quayle

Halloween, for example,

But

is

answer every possible query about the new administration's

is

will

simply imponderable.

We will just have to wait and

does allow one to see right through some of the most

lations. In the first

days of the

new

likely

be allowed out trick-or-treating on
see.

common postelection

specu-

administration, for example, the press ran riot with

speculation about a major collision between the United States and Japan over decisions to

FSX, to designate Japan as an "unfair" competitor under the "super 301 " provinew trade bill, and other issues. The decision by the European Economic
Community to (attempt to) unify its domestic market by 1992 is also being built up as
an almost cliff-hanging drama involving confrontations with both the United States
build the

sions of the

and Japan.

The analysis here
flicts

will put their
if

strongly indicates that these fears are vastly overdrawn. Strong con-

of interest certainly exist between the United States, Japan, and Europe, and they

stamp on the

world income

fell

politics of all three in the years to

come.

It is

also possible that

sharply (the scenario that currently alarms most policymakers begins

with a sudden collapse of the Tokyo stock exchange), a major breach might open within

what used

to

be called the Western

alliance.

But considering the clearly transnational

objectives of the political coalition that elected
tion
to

is

about as likely to abandon

G7

be sure, a somewhat lower rate

to usher in

George Bush,

for example, his administra-

cooperation, the long-run goal of dollar stability

in the

an American version of Solidarity. Global economic integration

bloc that brought him to power

is all

(at,

long run than today's), or global free trade as

about.

16

is

what the

it is

At the same time the West Germans
ministration desires, so that

if

in particular are likely to reflate less than the ad-

Martin Feldstein, with his constant

would have

unilateralism, did not exist, the administration
it

has.

On the other hand,

talk of

to invent

exchange

rate

— as, very likely,

him

Fed are clearly worried that a rise in
They are also convinced that the U.S.

the administration and the

the inflation rate would undermine dollar stability.

economy, while showing clear signs of a slowdown,
they have no incentive to push the dollar far

down

operating near capacity. In

is still

these circumstances, the last thing they think they need
in the

now

is

many more exports. Thus
some critics have

near future, as

advocated.

wing of the GOP, the situation is very complex. After his sweep of
the southern primaries, Bush owes nothing to most protectionists (an exception is the steel
industry, to which he had to make a public commitment during the general election, and
probably automobiles), so that many older industries particularly are apt to find a Bush
administration harder to deal with than Reagan's. Also, so many American industries are
In regard to the right

under pressure from Japan, there

is

stand on the principle of free trade.

no chance

One

that the

Bush administration can simply

suspects that with the newer industries, which

even many multinationalists believe have to be preserved

go as

tration will

far

down

the subsidy road that the

in

some form,

the

Bush adminis-

Reagan administration took

in its

second term as the budget deficit will allow.
In regard to that deficit,

though

it

flies in the face

it is

fairly

easy to predict what the administration will do,

of many conventional expectations. While far-right business

important to the Bush coalition than they were to Reagan's, the adminis-

groups are

less

tration has

little

to gain

by allowing

its

broad

GOP coalition to break up.

Bush has every

reason, therefore, to continue dramatizing his credentials as a true Reaganite.

and most convincing way by

far for

him

to

do

this is to

hold

The

easiest

fast to the tried-and-true

Reagan formula that was used in previous years to solve essentially the same problem: no
new taxes. For this to stick given the budget pressures, however, the administration will
have to turn a deaf ear to protests about the growing role of foreign capital in the economy
and guarantee a steady inflow of capital through
and no restrictions on foreign takeovers.

hancements"

that

It

may

G7

cooperation (particularly with Japan)

also have to accept further "revenue en-

do not encumber the top brackets, and it must succeed
economy's rate of growth while avoiding a recession.

in its high- wire

act of lowering the

My analysis of the Dole challenge,
istration's policy that

is

as

however, points to a final aspect of the Bush admin-

momentous

as

it is

unheralded.

On one hand,

the flap over John

Tower's appointment as secretary of Defense and recurrent procurement controversies
indicate that the administration

is

prepared to nod to reality and rein in the rate of growth

of defense spending. Bush and Baker from time to time have also

toward Gorbachev, as
truly distinctive
interests of the

and

if

made

friendly noises

backhandedly to acknowledge that the present Soviet leadership

really striving to

implement policy changes

that are very

much

is

in the

United States and, indeed, the entire world.

This part of the administration's line resembles Bush's retorts to Dole and other Repub-

The meliorist perspective, however, ill comports with
"Cold War is not yet over" talk from Defense Secretary Richard
Cheney and many other commentators within and around the administration. More omi-

lican critics during the primaries.

the steady stream of

nously, however,

it

has not appeared to inspire the administration's concrete foreign pol-

icy actions.

That was most obvious

in the late spring fiasco

17

with the West Germans over the mod-

.
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ernization of

NATO's

preparing

negotiating posture in regard to talks on both strategic

its

short-range missiles. But the administration has also taken

pean conventional disarmament. Earlier allusions

to rapid repeal of Jackson- Vanik re-

on U.S. -Soviet trade have mysteriously faded, while predictions of major

strictions

Western loans

USSR (which will almost certainly re-

to the Eastern bloc, including the

quire financing to cover imports of consumer goods

room) have yet

to

come

true.

18

if

perestroika

The Bush administration

is

to support Soviet

and Chinese admission

to

is

to have running

also clearly walking

Poland, and perhaps from other Eastern European countries, and

whether

time

its

weapons and Euro-

it is

away from

divided over

GATT.

A good- willed observer might attribute this pattern of inaction to confusion or bureaucratic delays. Alas,

The

otherwise.

my

statistical

plain fact

is

evidence about Dole's support in the primaries indicates

that despite detente 's ionospheric ratings in the

Gallup poll,

leading parts of American multinational business and the military are strongly opposed.

Once

the

Bush campaign decided

to reach out to Dole's supporters

the election by Bush's postconvention rhetoric,

important, by the award after the election of the

ment
ally

to

Lawrence Eagleberger, a

guaranteed the paralysis that

literal

first

— symbolized before

when he sounded like Dole, and more
number two position in the State Depart-

representative of Kissinger Associates

showed during

—

it

virtu-

the highly touted spring policy

review of East- West issues, which persists.

Because the pressures of the budget

deficit, other

American multinationals and

goods exporters, and many Europeans, especially the Germans (who have by
to lose) will

be

insistent, the administration

may

finally bend.

But

it

underestimate the pressures to stand aside and watch Gorbachev go
that could

would be rash

down

most

to

(an eventuality

perhaps be hastened by public predictions of just such an occurrence by leading

administration spokespersons)
dent.

capital

far the

— Dole, after

So while the Bush administration may

a small stick" policy designed to

all,

almost defeated an incumbent vice presi-

embark on a "speak loudly and carry
mask the departures from the early years of the Reagan
finally

era, the current situation, I fear, contains the seeds of a policy failure of historic propor-

tions.^
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government support for the computer industry in negotiations with Japan. Oil needs no comment, in general; nor do the (multinational free-trading) investment bankers, who barely make the
grade anyway.

I

strongly suspect interindustry differences play a role here, for

are representatives of several firms that have prominently

championed

in

the Bush

camp

and
expand into the role of nonbank banks. Many other investment bankers
have strongly opposed this, and this industry was one of those most likely to back Democrats in
the 1988 election. See Ferguson, "Parties by Invitation Only"; note that Table 1 is restricted to
Republican contributors and shows only relative concentrations among those who made at least
one contribution to the GOR
financial deregulation

are actively lobbying to

16.

See the Boston Globe, January

17.

See,

1

8.

e.g.,

Though
official

"Presidential

16, 1989.

Campaign

Hotline," February 23, 1988; Ferguson,

private banks usually provide

much

but involve high-level foreign policy deliberations.

rest,

1

Soviet gold reserves should

987).

make

They

are

Cf. Philip

in

no way "free market" outcomes,

Wellons, Passing the Buck (Boston:

Note also that short of mortally threatening
it

a

Bush."

of such financing, transactions of this kind involve

or unofficial cooperation by governments.

Harvard Business School Press,

"Who Bought

good

20

credit risk.

internal un-

